Patentee’s Teaching Away Argument Fails to Overcome Substantial Evidence of Unpatentability

An obviousness challenge can be overcome by showing the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention.  However, “teaching away” is a question of fact and thus subject to the substantial evidence standard in appeals from IPR decisions.  It is thus difficult to overcome a PTAB determination on this issue, as exemplified in Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., No. 2016-1755 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2017).

In Mereisonne, Google challenged four patent claims based on a two-reference obviousness argument.  The parties agreed that, together, the references taught every limitation of the claims.  The only issue on appeal was whether the secondary reference taught away from the claimed invention by criticizing an element of the invention.  The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s decision that it did not, finding substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s determination.

More particularly, the claims were directed to computer systems that users could use to identify suppliers of goods and services over the internet (basically, a directory).  The directory website included (1) a plurality of links to supplier websites, (2) a supplier description near the corresponding supplier link, (3) a title portion that describes the class of goods or services on the website, and (4) a rollover window that displays information about at least one of the suppliers corresponding to a link.

The rollover element was central to the dispute.  The prior art (Finseth) taught a visual index for a graphical search engine that provides “graphical output from search engine results or other URL lists.”  Finseth explained that many web directories included only cursory or cryptic text about the website in the results.  Finseth thus taught the use of thumbnail or other representational graphic information to accompany hyperlink results.  The primary reference, Hill, also explained that such abstract text was often “gibberish” and advocated visiting the actual site instead of relying on the abstract text accompanying the hyperlink.

The Federal Circuit agreed this criticism was not sufficient to teach away from the claimed rollover window (which corresponded to the prior art abstract test).  Despite the prior art’s criticisms, it did not that abstract text was useful in culling through results.  The Court also found that even if abstract text was often not useful, the prior art said that other links’ abstract text was useful.  Thus, the prior art did not sufficiently discourage the person of ordinary skill from following the path set out in the reference, and did not lead the person in a direction divergent from the path taken.

Troll Gets Rolled Because Its Disclaimer Statements Were Undersold

In MPHJ Tech v. Ricoh Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed a conclusion of anticipation and obviousness from an IPR involving US 8,488,173 (‘173). The content of the art was not really in dispute. Rather, the focus of the disagreement concerned just how broad is the reach of the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims.

The ‘173 patent claims a process by which a document can be scanned on one copy machine, and the reproduction printed at another location. Almost all copy machines used in modern offices have such functionality, but none of Ricoh, Xerox, or Lexmark had licensed the ‘173 patent from MPHJ. Therefore, MPHJ regarded every office that had such a copy machine as an infringer. MPHJ attracted quite a lot of publicity when it began sending demand letters to offices threatening lawsuits if payments of $1000 were not made for every worker in the office who uses the copy machine.

Ricoh, Xerox, and Lexmark requested IPR consideration of the ‘173. The claims at issue required that the process be instigated by the activation of a “Go button.” The two sides disagreed whether the claims read on processes in which a human user continued to intervene in the process after the “Go button” had been activated, or whether the claims were limited to processes in which all functions after the activation of the “Go button” continued automatically. Judges O’Malley and Lourie agreed with the PTAB that the claims read on processes with intervening human actions, while Judge Newman wrote a dissent to explain why she believes that even under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the claims only read on fully automated processes.

The real crux of the dispute was that the ‘173 patent derives from a provisional U.S. application, which is incorporated in the ‘173 patent by reference. The provisional explains that “[u]sing… Xerox’s Pagis, the user must first ‘import’ or scan paper in the capture application and then… direct the output to another location. With the [invention of ‘173], a single button (the Go button) directly copies paper… and places it with the third-party application.” Both the majority and the dissent appear to regard this language in the provisional as strong enough to disclaim processes—like Xerox’s—that require human intervention after the “Go button” activation.

However, this language was omitted from the non-provisional. The question, then, was what effect was accomplished by removing this limiting language between provisional and non-provisional applications. The majority concluded that a disclaimer can only be accomplished by clear and unambiguous statements, and the fact that the patent applicant removed the disclaiming language between provisional and non-provisional stages indicates that the patentee did not clearly intend to give up processes with intervening human actions. The dissent, by contrast, reasons that the provisional was incorporated by reference, and thus this limiting language is present in the non-provisional application.

It is worth noting that a similar situation (text found in provisional but not in non-provisional application) occurred in Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that case, a narrow definition of a claim term appeared in a provisional application, but that narrow definition was omitted from the corresponding non-provisional. However, because the non-provisional incorporated the provisional by reference, the Symantec court held that the narrow definition in the provisional controlled and compelled a verdict of non-infringement.

Despite the precedent in Symantec, the MPHJ majority held that the narrowing language in MPHJ’s provisional did not effect a disclaimer of claim scope. In other words, the Symantec court was willing to use the provisional to narrow the claim construction when a narrow construction lead to non-infringement, but in MPHJ—where a narrow construction would support patentability—the court discounted the narrowing language from the provisional.

Likely, the disparate outcomes between these two cases reflects the difference between broadest reasonable interpretation applied in IPRs and Philips standards of claim construction applied by district courts like the court in Symantec. The take-home lesson from this case is that parties to an IPR need to consider carefully not only the patent specification when evaluating potential claim constructions, but also documents incorporated by reference.

Federal Circuit to Reconsider Achates Decision en banc

The Federal Circuit is set to reconsider one of its more controversial decisions en banc, when it decides whether the Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc. decision was correctly decided. Specifically, in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., the Court requested supplemental briefing on the following issue:

“Should this court overrule Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and hold that judicial review is available for a patent owner to challenge the PTO’s determination that the petitioner satisfied the timeliness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) governing the filing of petitions for inter partes review?”

There have been several justices who have suggested that the Achates decision should be revisited by the entire bench, especially in view of the Supreme Court’s Cuozzo decision. We’ll have an answer soon on whether the broad discretion that has been afforded the PTAB regarding issues related to a decision to institute will continue, or whether the Federal Circuit will allow itself more leeway to consider foundational IPR issues.

IPR Estoppel Narrowed Even Further in D. Delaware Ruling

Despite the astounding success for patent challengers to date in IPR proceedings, are you one who has been worried about the effects of the IPR estoppel in future litigation? Has this concern dissuaded you from considering filing an IPR in the past? Fear no more, another decision from a federal court has taken a severely narrow view of the IPR estoppel of 35 USC §315(e)(2) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision….may not assert…in a civil action…that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.”).

On December 19th, Judge Robinson, from the District of Delaware, issued an order granting-in-part plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to references actually raised during a prior IPR. Intellectual Ventures I LLC et al v. Toshiba Corp., 1-13-cv-00453 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2016) (J. Robinson). That is, the Court ruled that defendant was not able to move forward in the litigation with a ground for obviousness that was actually raised during the earlier IPR trial between the parties.

Importantly, however, the Court also denied plaintiff’s summary judgment to the extent it sought to prevent defendant from raising grounds for invalidity based on references that were undisputedly available prior to the filing of the IPR and, thus, “could have been raised in the inter partes review.” Id. at 267. In coming to its conclusion, Judge Robinson focused on the language of §315(e)(2) that states that the estoppel applies for grounds that “reasonably could have been raised during that inter partes review.” Id. (emphasis in original). Citing the Federal Circuit’s decision in Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Judge Robinson noted that the Federal Circuit has construed 315(e)(2) “quite literally.” Id. That is, in Shaw, because the PTAB rejected certain grounds as redundant, the Federal Circuit held that the petitioner had not raised those grounds during the IPR. Id. While Judge Robinson understood that extending this logic “to prior art references that were never presented to the PTAB at all (despite their public nature) confounds the very purpose of this parallel administrative proceeding,” she could not “divine a reasoned way around the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in Shaw.

This decision is just another in a growing line of cases where federal courts have interpreted the scope of the IPR estoppel in a much narrower way than many expected. It should only increase the attractiveness of IPR proceedings given that there is little (and dwindling) downside to filing the proceedings.

Unreasonable Claim Construction Causes PTAB Reversal

 

In a fairly case-specific claim construction analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB today in D’Agostino v. Mastercard, Int’l, 2016-1592, -1593 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 12, 2016), finding that the Board erred in determining the challenged claims to be unpatentable because, as a matter of logic, the prior art could not anticipate or render those claims.

The patent at issue involved methods of effecting secure credit-card purchases by minimizing merchant access to credit card numbers. In those methods, a limited-use transaction code is given to the merchant in the place of the credit card number. Of particular importance to the Court’s decision was a “single-merchant” limitation that required that, when such a transaction code is requested, the request limits the number of authorized merchants to one, but does not then identify the merchant because the claims required that such identification occurred only later. Id. at 7.

In its claim construction during the inter partes review trial, the PTAB adopted a construction that did not recognize the separation in time of the communication of the transaction code and the communication of the merchant’s identity. Id. at 5-6. As might be expected, the Court relied upon the specification of the subject patent, as well as its file history, to support this claim construction. See, e.g., id. at 6 (“The prosecution history reinforces the evident meaning of the single-merchant limitation…”).

In general, this decision represents another decision that patent owners can point to in support of the notion that the Board is not flawless in all of its decisions. This particular Board panel made errors that, according to the Federal Circuit, were fairly obvious in nature helping to undercut any notion of Board infallibility.

PTAB Reversed on Issue of Diligent Reduction to Practice

cafc1Perfect Surgical Techniques (PST), Inc. owns US 6,030,384 (‘384). Olympus petitioned for inter partes review of ‘384 as anticipated or obvious over JP H10-33551 (JP ‘551). JP ‘551 published less than one year before the ‘384 priority date, and therefore JP ‘551 was only art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §102(a). PST offered a Rule 131 affidavit to remove JP ‘551 as prior art. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) ruled that the affidavit did not show sufficient evidence of continuous diligence between conception and reduction to practice, and therefore JP ‘551 is prior art to ‘384.

The ‘384 inventor was a working surgeon, so most of his working day was given over to patient care. Inventor hired a patent attorney to draft the application that later became ‘384, and the attorney sent the inventor a draft on 28 January 1998, thus proving that the inventor had conceived of the invention before JP ‘551 published on 10 February 1998. PST relied on the ‘384 filing date (1 May 1998) for reduction to practice. Therefore, PST had to show diligence between 9 February (the day before the publication date of the Japanese reference) and 1 May. PST submitted correspondence and invoices from the attorney to show that the inventor and attorney were working diligently in that intervening time, but these records only documented activity on 2, 4, 12, & 16 March and on 7 & 13 April.

The question for the PTAB, then, was whether the gaps between (e.g.) 4 and 12 March, or between 16 March and 7 April were so long as to show a lack of diligence. The PTAB concluded that these gaps showed that the inventor and attorney were not continuously exercising reasonable diligence.

On appeal, PST argued that the PTAB had applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring continuous exercise of reasonable diligence. PST argued—and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) agreed—that the correct standard is “reasonably continuous exercise of diligence.” In other words, one does not need evidence that one’s reasonable diligence was continuous, but rather one needs evidence that one’s diligence was “reasonably continuous.” See, Tyco Healthcare v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 774 F.3d 968, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“To establish diligence in reduction to practice, the basic inquiry is whether there was reasonably continuing activity to reduce the invention to practice,” internal quotations and ellipsis omitted).

The CAFC vacated and remanded for the PTAB to reconsider whether the evidence showed “reasonably continuous” diligence. Therefore, Perfect Surgical stands for the proposition that the standard for proving prior invention is not “continuous reasonable diligence,” but instead is “reasonably continuous diligence.”

Federal Circuit Broadly Affirms PTAB’s Determinations on Analogous Art, Motivation to Combine References, and Obviousness of Claims

43132461 - close-up of person hands using stamper on document with the text approved

The level of deference the Federal Circuit gives to the Board’s IPR decisions has been surprising to many practitioners, considering the Court’s reputation for reversing district court decisions.  The trend of deference to the Board continues, as illustrated in Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 2015-1810, -1811, Nov. 15, 2016.

Unwired involved one patent, U.S. 7,024,205.  The Board nullified the patent twice over, finding the claims obvious in an IPR, and lacking written description in a CBM proceeding.  Unwired involved a consolidated appeal of both.  The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s obviousness finding, and thus did not reach the CBM decision.

The ‘205 patent involved a system and method for providing cell phone users with prioritized search results based either on the user’s location, or based on other criteria chosen by the network administrator (the point of the latter is to allow search providers to prioritize results based on whether, for example, a restaurant has paid to be listed).  More particularly, the patent claims a scheme wherein the search results list a further-away provider before listing a different, closer provider (called “farther-over-nearer ordering” in the opinion).

Google presented a variety of prior art including basic references on providing search results in an electronic setting and also a 1997 book by Galitz discussing principles for interface design, including various techniques for ordering text information and menus.  On appeal, Unwired presented 3 arguments:  (1) Galitz was non-analogous art; (2) the prior art does not teach farther-over-nearer ordering; and (3) there was inadequate motivation to combine Galitz with the other art.

The Federal Circuit rejected all three arguments.  As to non-analogous art, the Court first noted that the field of endeavor of a patent is not limited to the point of novelty, the narrowest conception of the field, or the particular focus within a given field.  Because both Galitz and the patent dealt, broadly speaking, with the field of interface design, the Court determined a person of ordinary skill would have looked to Galitz.

Second, as to the prior art’s alleged lack of teaching, the evidence was clear that the prior art sometimes would have returned results with farther-over-nearing ordering, even though that wasn’t necessarily the goal of that prior art.  Nonetheless, that was legally sufficient:  “We reject this argument because combinations of prior art that sometimes meet the claim elements are sufficient to show obviousness.”  Lastly, the Court found sufficient evidence (including in the form of expert testimony) to believe that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references.  Here too, the Court presented a relatively broad (and challenger-friendly) reading of the law:  “Google also argues that it does not need to show that there was a known problem with the prior art system in order to articulate the required rational underpinning for the proposed combination.  We agree.”  This final point is consistent with KSR, as the opposite position (that the problem need to have been known) would seem perilously close to the TSM test rejected in KSR.

The Federal Circuit’s deference to the Board, and challenger-friendly reading of the law, in IPR appeals continues to encourage parties to pursue their positions through IPR petitions.

Federal Circuit Reins in PTAB’s Use of CBM Reviews

GavelIn Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., Case No. 2015-1812 (Fed. Cir. November 21, 2016), the Federal Circuit rejected the PTAB’s broad application of CBM reviews to claims that are merely “incidental” or “complementary” to financial activity:  “We hold that the Board’s reliance on whether the patent claims activities ‘incidental to’ or ‘complementary to’ a financial activity as the legal standard to determine whether a patent is CBM patent was not in accordance with law.”  Going forward, the breadth of patents for which the PTAB institutes CBM trials will be less extensive than in the past.

The America Invents Act (“AIA”) permits a Covered Business Method (“CBM”) review to be instituted only for a “covered business method patent,” which the AIA defines as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological invention.”  AIA § 18(d)(1).  The PTO adopted this definition of a “covered business method patent,” without elaboration, by regulation.  37 C.F.R. §42.301(a).

The challenged patent in this case was directed to a system that allows users of wireless devices (e.g., cell phones) to set “privacy preferences” that determine whether “client applications” can access their device’s location information.  The patent specification stated that “client applications may be service or goods providers whose business is geographically oriented,” such as a “hotel, restaurant, and/or store.”  The patent specification further stated that these businesses may wish to know that a wireless device and its user are nearby so that “relevant advertising may be transmitted to the wireless communications device.”  The PTAB then reasoned that the challenged claims were “incidental or complementary to” potential sales results from advertising.  On this basis, the PTAB found that the challenged patent was a “covered business method patent” and instituted the CBM review.

The Federal Circuit noted that this “incidental” or “complementary” language does not appear in the statutory or regulatory definition of “covered business method patent.”  Instead, that language originated from a statement Senator Schumer made, which the PTO quoted in its response to public comments concerning its consideration of proposed interpretations of the statutory definition for a CBM patent.  The Federal Circuit noted that general policy statements are not legally binding, and, without adopting a policy as a rule through rulemaking – which the PTO did not do here – an “agency cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy as law.”

The Federal Circuit went on to acknowledge that the “incidental” or “complementary” to financial activity test is overbroad in any event, explaining that, for example, a patent for a novel lightbulb that is found to work particularly well in bank vaults does not become a CBM patent because of its incidental or complementary use in banks.  “It is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the specification speculates such a potential sale might occur” to be considered a CBM patent.

As evident by the facts of this case, the PTAB has, until now, applied the CBM standard very liberally.  That trend is now likely to take a turn, at least somewhat.

In re NuVasive Brings the Administrative Procedure Act to IPRs

45686244_sNuVasive owns US 8,187,334, which claims certain spinal implants. Medtronic filed a petition challenging various claims of the ‘334 patent as obviousness over US 2002/0165550 (Frey) in view of US 5,860,973 (Michelson). Medtronic also filed a second petition challenging other claims over a promotional brochure for the Synthes Vertebral Spacer-PR (SVS-PR) in view of Michelson. Medtronic specifically mentioned Michelson figure 18 in its argument for obviousness over Frey, but not in its argument about obviousness over SVS-PR. The PTAB instituted two separate IPR proceedings on these two petitions. The proceedings were not consolidated, but there was a single oral hearing held for both proceedings.

In its patent owner response, NuVasive argued that its claimed implant was long and narrow, but that the cited art taught long and wide implants, for larger surface area to stabilize. Medtronic responded by noting that Michelson’s figure 18 shows a long and narrow implant. NuVasive attempted to have Medtronic’s response stricken as a new ground of rejection not present in the petition, or alternatively to be allowed to file a surreply. The PTAB denied both requests, and cut NuVasive off when it tried to make arguments on this point during the oral hearing.

Both IPRs ended with a determination that all challenged claims but one were unpatentable. Both final decisions relied on Michelson figure 18 to establish prima facie obviousness.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed the first IPR (in which figure 18 was cited in the petition). However, the CAFC vacated the second IPR, and remanded for the PTAB to give NuVasive a chance to respond to Medtronic’s argument about figure 18. The CAFC concluded that this result was compelled by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which requires (5 U.S.C. § 706) that a reviewing court “set aside agency action… not in accordance with law [or]… without observance of procedure required by law.” This case constitutes only the second time (after Dell Inc. v. Acceleron LLC, 818 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) that an IPR appellant has successfully challenged a PTAB defeat on APA grounds.

There are a few points to pause and notice about this outcome. First, the argument here is not about introducing a new reference into the mix, but rather about whether NuVasive was sufficiently on notice about one figure in Michelson. Second, there is no question that NuVasive actually knew about Michelson figure 18 at the time that it was writing its response to the argument about SVS-PR, because figure 18 was cited in the Frey petition. In other words, the APA failure here lay in not calling out figure 18 in the other of the pair of IPR petitions. It requires a very rigorous application of the APA to find reversible error in this argument about figure 18.

Other appellants have made APA arguments after a PTAB loss, and the NuVasive court was careful to distinguish from the cases in which APA arguments failed. In particular, the NuVasive court distinguished Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. v. Biomarin Pharm., 825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2015). While the PTAB decisions in those cases had cited references or portions of references not specifically mentioned in the petition, the “new” material was merely cited as background, but not relied upon for part of the prima facie rejection.

There are a few take-home lessons to learn from this. First, if you are challenging a patent, be careful about citing to any portion of a reference in the challenger’s reply that was not cited in the petition. Similarly, if you are defending a patent, pay careful attention to what is cited in the challenger’s reply, compared to the original petition, and do not be shy about insisting on a right to make additional replies to anything that is cited for the first time in the reply. Finally—and more broadly—this case shows that the APA can provide a successful basis for an appeal from the PTAB.

Federal Circuit Weighs in on Evidentiary Challenge in IPR, Reversing PTAB

34447773_sMore often than not, evidentiary issues in IPR proceedings fail to make headlines because the Board will structure its Final Written Decision to avoid evidentiary challenges. Findings that a party’s motion to exclude is denied as moot are common. That makes the Federal Circuit’s decision in REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC v. Neste Oil Oyj (November 8, 2016) all the more interesting. In that decision, the Court reversed the Board’s decision to exclude certain evidence submitted by Patent Owner during the trial.

More specifically, Patent Owner sought to swear behind one of the prior art references presented in the Petition. Among the evidence provided for this purpose was test data from third parties, communications between the inventor and third parties, and minutes from a meeting that the inventor had attended. Id. at 5. Petitioner moved to exclude this evidence on the basis of lack of authentication, hearsay, or as improper reply evidence. The Board granted the motion to exclude.

On appeal, the Court first clarified that priority issues, including conception and reduction to practice, are questions of law predicated on subsidiary factual findings. Id. at 6. The Court addressed the Board’s finding that two emails between the inventor and a third party (Exhibit 2061 in the case) provided necessary corroboration of the patented invention. Id. at 16. Petitioner argued that the emails were hearsay because they contain out of court statements by a third party. Patent Owner responded by arguing that it did not offer the emails to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The Court agreed with Patent Owner, finding that the emails were offered for the non-hearsay purpose to show that the inventor thought he had achieved a quality claimed in the patent-at-issue. “The act of writing and sending the email is, by itself, probative evidence on whether [the inventor] recognized–at the time that he had written the email–” the claimed property. Id. at 17. In short, the exhibit was legally significant because it showed that the inventor communicated the conception of the invention to the third party.

Because the Board excluded relevant evidence in the trial, the case was remanded for further consideration.